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Abstract—Although the ADS-B system is going to play a major 
role in the safe navigation of airplanes and air traffic control 
(ATC) management, it is also well known for its lack of security 
mechanisms. Previous research has proposed various methods for 
improving the security of the ADS-B system and mitigating 
associated risks. However, these solutions typically require the use 
of additional participating nodes (or  sensors) (e.g., to verify the 
location of the airplane by analyzing the physical signal) or 
modification of the current protocol architecture (e.g., adding 
encryption or authentication mechanisms.) Due to the regulation 
process regarding avionic systems and the fact that the ADS-B 
system is already deployed  in most airplanes, applying such 
modifications to the current protocol at this stage is impractical. 
In this paper we propose an alternative security solution for 
detecting anomalous ADS-B messages aimed at the detection of 
spoofed or manipulated ADS- B messages sent by an attacker or 
compromised airplane. The proposed approach utilizes an LSTM 
encoder-decoder algorithm for modeling flight routes by analyzing 
sequences of legitimate ADS-B messages. Using these models, 
aircraft can autonomously evaluate received ADS-B messages and 
identify deviations from the legitimate flight path (i.e., anomalies). 
We examined our approach on six different flight route datasets to 
which we injected different types of anomalies. Using our 
approach  we were able to detect all of the injected attacks with an  
average false alarm rate of 4.3% for all of datasets. 
 
Keywords—ADS-B; Security; LSTM; Anomaly Detection; 
Aviation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, there has been a significant increase in 
the number of flight movements around the world, with an 
average of approximately 100,000 registered flight movements 
per day, estimated by the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) in 2015.1 Due to the growing need for 
civilian flights and the adoption of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAC), the number of registered flight movements around the 
world will undoubtedly continue to increase. In fact, according 
to IATA forecasts, this number is predicted to soar and will 
likely double by 2035.2 
In order to provide safe navigation and reduce the cost of air 
traffic control (ATC), the aviation community has been moving 
from uncooperative and independent air traffic surveillance,  
such  as  primary  surveillance  radar  (PSR)    or 
 
1  http://www.iata.org/about/Documents/iata-annual-review-2016.pdf 
2  http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2016-10-18-02.aspx 
secondary surveillance radar (SSR), to cooperative and 
dependent air traffic surveillance (CDS), such as ADS-B. 
Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) [1] is 
a modern implementation of SSR certified by the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) which is expected to play a major role in 
aviation in the future. The ADS-B system provides the ability 
to continuously and precisely localize aircraft movements in 
dense air space. An aircraft equipped with an ADS-B 
transponder (transmitter-responder) is capable of deriving its 
position from the navigation satellite system, and then 
broadcasts the aircraft’s flight number, speed, position, and 
altitude at an average rate of 4.2 messages per second. 
Unlike issues of cost and accuracy, which were major 
considerations in the development of ADS-B, security was 
pushed to the sidelines. This resulted in a widely used 
technology with highly compromised security, particularly in 
terms of the protocol mechanism, as follows: 
No message authentication and encryption:  messages are 
broadcast as plain text without an authentication code or digital 
signature and therefore can be replayed, manipulated,  or 
forged. 
No aircraft authentication: authorized aircraft or ATC 
stations don’t have to authenticate before transmitting; thus, 
there is no way to distinguish between authorized and 
unauthorized entities. As a result, an unauthorized entity can 
inject messages or tamper with an authorized entity’s reports. 
Previous research has demonstrated that it is  relatively easy 
to compromise the security of ADS-B with off-the-shelf 
hardware and software [2][3]. The ability to exploit the ADS- 
B system endangers billions of passengers every year, and 
therefore there have been attempts by academia and industry  to 
develop solutions that address the lack of security. 
Past research suggested the use of encryption [4], aircraft 
authentication via challenge-response [5], and message 
authentication [3][6], in order to provide secured message 
broadcast and prevent eavesdropping. Besides securing 
broadcast communication, additional approaches focused on 
verifying velocity and location reports via additional sensors  or 
nodes. However, most of those solutions require modifications 
to the architecture in order to enable key exchange or establish 
trust between entities. Since the FAA  has mandated the use of 
ADS-B for all aircraft movements within the  US airspace  by 
2020,  a  requirement  that  already 
exists for some aircraft in Europe, and due to the strict 
regulation process regarding the implementation of avionic 
systems, applying modifications to the current protocol at this 
stage is impractical (note that the ADS-B protocol design and 
development began in the early 1990s). 
In this study we propose an alternative security solution for 
detecting anomalous ADS-B messages; specifically, our 
approach is aimed at detecting spoofed or manipulated ADS-B 
messages sent by an attacker or compromised airplane. The 
proposed approach does not require any modification or 
additional participating nodes and/or sensors, and enables 
aircraft to detect anomalies in the dense air space 
autonomously. Our approach is designed to address message 
spoofing by observing a sequence of messages and estimating 
its credibility. Since flights between airports usually take place 
via similar routes, we use and train an LSTM (long short-term 
memory) encoder-decoder model based on previous 
(legitimate) flights for a given route. Using such a model, each 
aircraft can independently evaluate received ADS-B messages 
and identify deviations from the legitimate flight path. 
We examined our approach using six datasets, each dataset 
contains flight information for a selected route. In our 
experiment we injected different types of anomalies  (erroneous 
data) into this data and demonstrated that our approach was able 
to detect all of the injected attacks with an average of 4.303% 
false alarm rate. In addition, we measured the alarm delay as the 
number of messages sent from the moment the attack started 
until detection. 
The contributions of our paper are as follows. First, to the 
best of our knowledge, we are the first to utilize machine 
learning techniques to secure the ADS-B protocol; specifically, 
we show that sequences of ADS-B messages can be modeled 
by using the LSTM encoder-decoder algorithm. Second, we 
show that the LSTM encoder-decoder model can be used to 
amplify anomalies and thus facilitates the detection of 
anomalous messages. Third, our proposed approach can 
overcome ADS-B shortcomings, particularly in the case of 
spoofed/fake messages, using standalone solutions that do not 
require architecture changes and can be applied by each aircraft 
independently. Finally, the proposed model is adaptive and 
flexible, so it can be trained and applied to new routes. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
provides an overview of the ADS-B protocol and its security 
risks, and Section III presents prior studies that proposed 
security solutions for the ADS-B protocol. Section IV contains 
a description of our proposed approach for detecting anomalous 
ADS-B messages and our feature extraction process. Section V 
describes our evaluation and discusses the results. Finally, 
Section VI concludes the paper and mentions future work 
directions. 
II. OVERVIEW OF ADS-B PROTOCOL AND RELATED RISKS 
A. Protocol Overview 
Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is a 
satellite-based ‘radar-like’ system that automatically, 
independently, and continuously derives the aircraft’s position 
from the global navigation satellite system (e.g., GPS, 
GLONASS, and Galileo) and broadcasts the data to nearby 
aircraft and ground stations. ADS-B was developed in order to 
improve air traffic control and was rolled out as a replacement 
to traditional primary/secondary radar. Providing improved 
accuracy and greater coverage in both radar and non-radar 
environments (e.g., mountain areas and oceans), ADS-B is 
designed to prevent collisions and improve utilization and 
throughput of aircraft in dense airspace. 
The system includes two subsystems: ADS-B Out and ADS-
B In. The ADS-B In subsystem enables aircraft to receive 
broadcast messages of other nearby aircraft. The ADS- B Out 
subsystem enables aircraft to continually broadcast messages. 
The system enables an aircraft to broadcast unencrypted 
messages that provide the position of the aircraft, its velocity, 
and its altitude, as well as additional information, using the 
ADS-B Out subsystem. The transmitted messages are processed 
by nearby aircraft and ATC stations on the ground using the 
ADS-B In subsystem (illustrated in Figure  1). 
 
 
Fig. 1. An illustration of the ADS-B system. Position is provided by  the GNSS, 
processed by the aircraft, and broadcast by the ADS-B Out subsystem. Ground 
stations and nearby aircraft receive these messages via the ADS-B In 
subsystem. Ground stations then transmit the aircraft’s data to ATC. 
B. Risk Overview 
The ADS-B system is lacking basic security mechanisms 
such as authentication, message integrity, and encryption. In 
light of the need for real-time information, these security gaps 
make the application of the protocol in the crowded  skies risky, 
exposing aircraft to the following types of attacks: 
 Eavesdropping: The lack of message encryption and 
insecure broadcast transmissions makes eavesdropping 
over the medium by both adversaries (e.g., potential 
terrorist groups) and non-adversaries (e.g., commercial 
Internet websites) easy, allowing outsiders to track air 
traffic. McCallie, et al. [7] describes “Aircraft 
Reconnaissance” as an eavesdropping attack that may 
target specific aircraft or seek to gain information about 
the air traffic. 
 DoS: Denial of service attacks can have a significant 
impact on real-time systems like ADS-B. For example, 
a jamming attack, in which a single participant is 
prevented from sending or receiving messages by an 
attacker. Wilhelm, et al. [8] demonstrated feasible real- 
time jamming in wireless networks, thus raising concern 
in aviation networks. 
 Spoofing via message injection/deletion: Since there 
are no challenge-response mechanisms in the ADS-B 
system, neither entities (sender and receiver) are 
authenticated. Thus, an attacker can broadcast forged 
messages using low cost commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) software, impersonate an authorized entity,  or 
even inject ghost aircraft information, as illustrated in 
[9]. Furthermore, message modification via different 
approaches, namely overshadowing, bit-flipping, and 
message deletion, using destructive and constructive 
interference are discussed by Strohmeier in [10]. 
C. Adversary Model 
Understanding the adversary model is essential in order to 
estimate an attacker’s capabilities of performing the attacks 
mentioned above. We distinguish between the following two 
kinds of attackers: 
 External attacker – an external attacker is an adversary 
that can execute simple attacks using COTS 
transponders. In order to transmit signals, one does not 
have to authenticate or belong to a specific airline. 
Therefore, while standing on the ground, an external 
attacker could receive and transmit signals, and perform 
DoS, eavesdropping, and spoofing attacks, however as 
suggested by Strohmeier et al. [11], there are several 
approaches to detect an attacker in this situation (e.g., 
measuring the Pearson correlation coefficient between 
the claimed aircraft’s position and the received signal 
strength). More complicated attacks performed via 
UAVs or drones will be much harder to detect via signal 
analysis. 
 Internal attacker – an internal attacker is an adversary 
that has achieved access to the system and affects its 
behavior (e.g., an ATC crew member or aircraft 
maintenance worker). An internal attacker can 
manipulate the data processing phase or disrupt the 
system modules. 
III. RELATED WORK 
Previous publications investigated the security challenges 
associated with the ADS-B system and proposed various 
methods and solutions for protecting the system. The main ideas 
in previous research include encryption, physical layer analysis, 
and multilateration technique. The following topics provides an 
overview of relevant methods and work. 
 
A. Encryption 
Cryptographic measures have been tested for securing 
communication in wireless networks. Strohmeier et al. [10] 
discussed the question of whether the current implementation 
of ADS-B can be encrypted. In addition, Finke et al. [4] 
introduced a number of encryption schemes. However, the 
worldwide deployment of the ADS-B system makes the 
encryption key management a challenge. Costin et al. [3] and 
Feng et al. [6] suggested PKI (public key infrastructure) 
solutions based on transmitting signatures and the Elliptic 
Curve cryptography, respectively. Another solution discussed 
in the literature is the use of the retroactive key publication 
technique, such as the use of µTESLA protocol [10]; this 
however requires modifications to the current mechanism of the 
protocol by adding a new message type for key publishing. 
B. Physical Layer Analysis and Doppler Effect 
One of the most dangerous types of attack is spoofed 
message injection. Strohmeier et al. [11] proposed an intrusion 
detection system, based on physical layer information and a 
single receiver, in order to detect such attacks on critical air 
traffic infrastructures without additional cooperation by the 
aircraft. Another solution suggested by Ghose et al. [12] is to 
verify the velocity and position of the aircraft by exploiting  the 
short coherence time of the wireless channel and the Doppler 
spread phenomenon. A method presented by Schäfer [13] is 
based on verification of the motion using the Doppler effect. 
Both options rely upon the participation of ground stations or 
other entities. 
C. Multilateration and Group Verification 
In the last decade, signal analysis has been successfully 
employed in the fields of wireless communication. One popular 
form of cooperative independent surveillance that has been used 
in the military and civil applications is multilateration (MLAT). 
MLAT is a navigation technique based on the measurement of 
the time difference of arrival (TDOA) between at least two 
stations at known locations. A method to provide a means for 
back-up ADS-B communication based on MLAT was provided 
by Smith [16]. Additional work based on MLAT suggested by 
Schäfer et al. [14] showed that it is possible to verify a 3D route 
with a  group of four verifiers. In addition, Strohmeier et al. [15] 
suggested a method of continuous location verification by 
computing the differences in the expected TDOA between at 
least two sensors. 
IV. PROPOSED MODEL 
A. Motivation 
Detecting anomalies using standard approaches of 
predictive models, especially when detecting anomalies in a 
time series, is a challenging task, since the context of the current 
sample and its past may influence its value. 
We therefore opt to use an LSTM encoder-decoder 
algorithm in order to profile flight routes and detect  anomalies. 
The use of applying machine learning (specifically deep 
learning models) does not require modifications to the current 
architecture of the ADS-B system or additional participating 
nodes. This allows the aircraft to autonomously and 
independently analyze ADS-B messages for anomaly detection. 
We define an ADS-B window of size n as a sequence of n 
consecutive ADS-B messages. A malicious window is defined 
as a window which includes at least one spoofed ADS-B 
message. The window containing all messages of a flight from 
the   i-th   message   to   the   i+n   message   is   denoted     by 
𝑊[𝑖 , 𝑛] = {𝑥(𝑖) , 𝑥(𝑖+1), … , 𝑥(𝑖+𝑛)}. Each entry x(j) is a vector 
consisting of features extracted for message j during the flight. 
 
The LSTM encoder-decoder algorithm is utilized for 
detecting anomalous (malicious) windows. This is done by 
training an encoder-decoder model for a route from takeoff 
point A to landing point B. During the training phase we fit  the 
model to reconstruct normal (benign) windows of flights from 
point A to point B. For each tested window we first use LSTM 
in order to encode the sequence of ADS-B messages 
(where each message is represented by the vector of features) 
to a fixed dimension vector (i.e., sequence to sequence model). 
Then we use a decoder based on LSTM to decode and 
reconstruct the tested window. When the model reconstructs  an 
anomalous window it may not reconstruct the sequence  well 
and will therefore amplify the reconstruction error. 
B. Feature Extraction 
In order to be able to differentiate between normal and 
anomalous windows, the extraction of meaningful  features that 
will provide the context of the flight is required. 
First, we extract the aircraft’s speed, geolocation (latitude / 
longitude), altitude, and heading from each message. In order 
to provide contextual flight-progress, we also extract 
representative features for each flight. This is done by 
computing the average path of a route (using previous 
legitimate flight records) and extract four major geolocation 
points for each source and destination (illustrated in Figure 2). 
Afterwards, we measure the distance between each point in 
the route (latitude, longitude, as received by the messages) and 
the aforementioned major points (see Figure 2) using the 
inverse method of Vincenty’s distance formulae [17]. 
 
C. Model Description 
1) Training the LSTM encoder-decoder model 
As presented by Malhotra et al. in [18], we train an LSTM 
encoder-decoder model to reconstruct windows of benign 
sequences with minimal error; i.e., the model attempts to output 
the same input sequence of vectors. 
This is achieved by using an LSTM encoder that learns from 
fixed length sequences of messages (each message is 
represented by the vector of features) by optimizing the hidden 
layer (HD). The LSTM decoder reconstructs the window using 
the current hidden state of the decoder (HD) and the values 
predicted in the previous message (see Figure 3). 
2) Applying the LSTM encoder-decoder model 
Since during the training phase the model is trained to 
reconstruct a legitimate sequence of messages (i.e., a window), 
we expect both of the model’s inputs and outputs to look alike. 
In contrast, when we apply the model on a malicious window 
(i.e., containing spoofed messages), we expect the model to  fail 
at reconstructing it, and therefore input vectors (input window) 
and output vectors (predicted window) will differ significantly. 
 
 
Fig. 2. An average flight from the London dataset. For each point P in the flight, 
the Vincenty distance from A, B, C, and D is calculated. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Illustration of the LSTM-based encoder-decoder. The steps for 
obtaining the prediction of window Ŵ[i , L]  from input window W[i , L] are as 
follows: (1) the encoder encodes the input vectors into a fixed sized vector, 
and (2) the decoder decodes the fixed sized vector in an attempt to reconstruct 
the original window. 
 
After predicting the output window Ŵ[i , L]  corresponding to 
the target input window W[i , L], we obtain the reconstruction 
error of each vector representing an ADS-B message using the 
Cosine similarity (see Equation 1). The overall anomaly score 
of the input window is computed according to Equation 2. 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑥, ?̂?):
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V. EXPERIMENTS 
We conducted a set of experiments in order to evaluate our 
proposed approach, and more specifically, the ability of our 
approach to model an arbitrarily chosen route and use this 
model to deduce whether a given flight (or a segment of the 
flight) is benign or an anomaly. 
A. Dataset 
Collected dataset: We used a large-scale dataset from the 
online flight tracking network, FlightRadar24,3 for our 
evaluation. FlightRadar24 provides access to data collected 
from thousands of ground stations. The extracted datasets are 
presented in Table I. 
Injected anomalies. In order to evaluate the performance 
of the learned model, we injected three types of anomalies (a 
segment of 70 sequential messages, from message 180 to 
message 250) into the flights included in the test sets: 
Random noise (RND) – anomalies are generated by adding 
random noise. We multiplied the original values of the 
message attributes of the ADS-B messages with a randomly 
generated floating number between 0 and 2. 
Different route (ROUTE) – anomalies are generated by 
replacing a segment of the ADS-B messages of the tested 
flight with a segment of messages from a different (legitimate) 
route. In our evaluation, we replaced a segment from the 
flights in our datasets with segment from the flight between 
Suvarnabhumi Airport, Thailand and Tashkent International 
Airport, Uzbekistan (the Thailand dataset). 
Gradual drift (DRIFT) – anomalies are generated as a gradual 
drift in the altitude feature. This is done by modifying the - 
 
3 http://www.flightradar24.com 
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altitude of a segment of messages by continuously 
raising/lowering the altitude by an increasing multiplier of 400 
feet (i.e., for the first message in the anomalous segment the 
altitude will be increased/decreased by 400 feet, the second 
message will be increased/decreased by 800 feet, and so on).  In 
our evaluation we generated two types of gradual drifts by 
lowering the altitude value (denoted as SHIFT Down) and 
raising the altitude value (denoted as SHIFT Up). 
By selecting and evaluating these types of anomalies we are 
able to represent two types of attackers. The first, is a naïve 
adversary (RND and ROUTE anomalies) with the goal of 
adding observable noise to the air-space view in order to reduce 
the credibility of the ADS-B system and disrupt the traffic 
management. The second adversary is less aggressive and more 
sophisticated that attempts to influence the air-space view by 
adding reasonable (less observable) gradually-drifted messages  
(in location or altitude) which may result in a collision in air. 
B. Evaluation Approach and Configuration 
The experiments were conducted using the 10-fold cross-
validation approach as follows. We divided the flights of each 
dataset into 10 folds, each containing an equal number of 
flights. For each fold i and dataset DS (London, Milano, 
Moscow, Washington, Paris, and Las Vegas) the training set 
includes all of the flights in DS, excluding the flights of the i-th 
fold (denoted by Traini(DS)); the flights of the i-th fold are used 
for testing (denoted by Testi(DS)). The Testi(DS) dataset was 
duplicated four times; for each copy, a set of malicious windows 
were injected (as mentioned from message 180 to message 250) 
according to the four types of anomalies (one type of anomaly 
for each copy). We denote these datasets by: 
𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑅𝑁𝐷
(𝐷𝑆) ,𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐸 
(𝐷𝑆) ,𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑆𝐻𝐼𝐹𝑇 𝑈𝑃 
(𝐷𝑆) ,𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑆𝐻𝐼𝐹𝑇 𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 
(𝐷𝑆) . 
In our experiments the window size (i.e., the size of the 
sequence input to the LSTM encoder-decoder model) was set at 
L=15. In addition, in order to evaluate the model derived from 
the training set, we defined a window that contains 15 messages 
as a malicious window if it contains at least one spoofed 
message. In order to set the threshold value for an anomalous 
window, we performed 5-fold cross-validation evaluation on 
Train (DS). Since the Train (DS) dataset includes 
benign flights only, we obtained the anomaly scores (Equation 
2) and defined the value that exceeds 95% of the errors as the 
threshold       value       for       the       testing       phase        of: 
         𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑅𝑁𝐷
(𝐷𝑆) ,𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑇𝐸 
(𝐷𝑆) ,𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑆𝐻𝐼𝐹𝑇 𝑈𝑃 
(𝐷𝑆) ,𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑆𝐻𝐼𝐹𝑇 𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 
(𝐷𝑆) . 
To assess the performance of the models, we examined the 
corresponding false positive rate (FPR), true positive rate 
(TPR), and the alarm delay of the model (measured as the 
number of messages from the beginning of the attack until a 
malicious window is detected). 
C. Results 
Figure 4 contains a graphical representation of  the anomaly 
score for each type of attack for a single representative flight, 
randomly chosen from the London dataset. It illustrates the 
increase in the anomaly score as the anomaly becomes more 
significant. This is because the evaluated input window contains 
an increasing number of anomalous message. The Gradual Drift 
anomaly (SHIFT DOWN) of the same selected flight is also 
visualized on top of a geographical map in Figure 5. Each icon 
indicate a window of ADS-B messages where the actual 
location is set according to the location of the last ADS-B 
message in the window. 
The results of the experiments are presented in Table II. 
Table II shows the average and standard deviation of the FPR, 
TPR, and alarm delay time for each type of attack. We can infer 
from the results that the proposed model can efficiently predict 
an ongoing anomaly, while the alarm delay time changes 
according to the attack’s aggressiveness. As can be seen, attacks 
of type RND and ROUTE were detected almost immediately. 
This is due to the fact that they affected more than one attribute 
of the ADS-B message. On the other hand, the SHIFT Down 
and SHIFT Up type of attacks affected only one attribute 
(altitude),  therefore the delay time was longer. 
In an attempt to reduce the rate of false alarms, we examined 
the results using a collective (aggregative) anomaly by raising 
an alert only when a sequence of t malicious windows were 
detected. We examined the detection rate and false alarm rate 
for t=5, 10, and 15. The results are presented in Table III which 
shows the false alarm rate for each dataset and for different 
values of t averaged for all folds and attacks. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Example of a flight with injected anomalies. The malicious windows 
are represented by red rectangles. 
Dataset 
Name 
 
Description 
Number 
of flights 
Approx. 
flight 
duration 
 
Dates of flights 
London Flights between Ben Gurion Airport, 
Israel and Luton Airport, London 
80 5 hours 
May 15, 2017 – 
July 1, 2017 
Milano Flights between Ben Gurion Airport, 
Israel and Malpensa Airport, Italy 
65 3.75 hours March 7, 2017 
– July 27, 2017 
 
Moscow 
Flights between Moscow 
Sheremetyevo Airport, Russia and 
Heathrow Airport, London 
 
54 
 
4 hours 
May 3, 2017 – 
July 7, 2017 
 
Washington 
Flights between San Francisco 
Airport, United States and Washington 
Dulles Airport, United States 
 
70 
 
4.3 hours 
April 10, 2017 
– July 9, 2017 
 
Paris 
Flights between Kiev Boryspil 
Airport, Ukraine and Paris Charles de 
Gaulle Airport, France 
 
68 
 
3 hours 
April 3, 2017 – 
July 9, 2017 
 
Las Vegas 
Flights between Benito Juarez Airport, 
Mexico and Las Vegas McCarran 
Airport, United States 
 
80 
 
3.3 hours 
February 20, 
2017 – July 7, 
2017 
Thailand 
(used for 
generating 
anomalies) 
A flight between Suvarnabhumi 
Airport, Thailand and Tashkent 
International Airport, Uzbekistan 
 
1 
 
6 hours 
 
July 6, 2017 
 
  
Fig. 5. SHIFT DOWN visualization of a selected flight. Each icon indicates 
the location of the aircraft and represents a window of ADS- B messages. The 
size of the icon indicates the reported altitude of the aircraft and the color of 
the icon indicates the anomaly level derived by the relevant model (Red being 
an anomalous window and Green benign window). 
TABLE II. EXPERIMENTS RESULTS 
 
 RND ROUTE SHIFT UP SHIFT DOWN 
London Dataset 
Alarm delay 1.0±0.0 1.0±0.0 26.91±2.15 26.49±2.42 
FPR 5.56±1.30% 5.48±1.41% 5.34±1.38% 5.34±1.30% 
TPR 98.43±1.30% 97.13±0.23% 36.87±4.10% 45.12±3.99% 
Milano Dataset 
Alarm delay 1.0±0.0 1.0±0.0 33.17±1.17 29.34±1.45 
FPR 5.75±2.04% 5.75±2.04% 5.47±2.05% 5.47±2.05% 
TPR 98.44±0.00% 98.44±0.00% 43.14±2.20% 51.92±2.43% 
Moscow Dataset 
Alarm delay 1.0±0.0 1.0±0.0 33.333±2.04 28.816±2.92 
FPR 4.2±1.46% 4.2±1.46% 3.87±1.45% 3.87±1.46% 
TPR 98.82±0.06% 98.82±0.06% 59.04±2.30% 65.47±2.23% 
Washington Dataset 
Alarm delay 1.0±0.0 1.0±0.0 35.65±2.28 30.97±2.70 
FPR 5.14±1.15% 5.1±1.15% 4.86±1.15% 4.87±1.00% 
TPR 98.80±0.00% 98.80±0.00% 55.52±3.12% 63.06±3.67% 
Paris Dataset 
Alarm delay 1.0±0.0 1.0±0.0 37.44±5.30 31.74±2.14 
FPR 5.39±2.78% 5.39±.78% 4.96±2.71% 5.15±2.80% 
TPR 98.84±0.00% 98.84±0.00% 51.93±6.96% 61.37±2.28% 
Las Vegas Dataset 
Alarm delay 1.0±0.0 1.0±0.0 35.45±2.72 34.50±3.86 
FPR 5.52±0.92% 5.52±0.92% 5.20±0.91% 5.20±0.91% 
TPR 98.80±0.00% 98.80±0.00% 49.49±3.37% 48.95±5.74% 
TABLE III. AVERAGE FALSE ALARM RATE 
 
Dataset Name t=5 t=10 t=15 
London 4.70 1.26 0.55 
Milano 8.70 2.21 0.57 
Moscow 2.51 0.75 0.53 
Washington 4.20 2.28 1.28 
Paris 2.35 0.35 0.05 
Las Vegas 0.20 0.11 0.05 
 
As can be observed, the lowest false alarm rate was attained for 
t=15. Note that in all cases the true attack was detected; that is, 
the detection rate is 1.0. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this study, we proposed a flexible and adaptive time 
series anomaly detection scheme for false data injected into 
ADS-B messages, based on an LSTM encoder-decoder model. 
We validated our model using six FlightRadar24 datasets, 
injected with four types of false data. We detected each 
injection type with a low false alarm rate. Based on this, we can 
deduce that it is possible to detect anomalies or estimate the 
legitimacy of messages without changing the ADS-B protocol 
or its underlying architecture. In future work we plan to 
evaluate our approach using anomalies representing more 
sophisticated attacks and compare the results of the  model after   
tuning   various   hyper-parameters   and   adding   more 
features. In addition, we plan to model the airspace state in a 
certain geo-location in order to provide more contextual 
information. This will enable the detection of replay attacks and 
DoS attacks. 
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